The subtitle of this section is "Foreclosures and Community Associations"
Surprised? Ha!
An insurance professional and three lawyers are discussing the pitfalls and risks associated with foreclosures; both those done correctly, and those which have problems.
The moderator, Jamie Schraff, is recommending communications with association members. Barry Postman, Esq., who disclaims pursuing collections as part of his regular practice, is suggesting communications with owners and a case-by-case analysis on whether or not to pursue individual collections. Leonard Siegel suggests inquiring as to the debtor's solvency prior to the commencement of a foreclosure.
Florida now mandates, via statute, a "meet and confer" conference with the debtor prior to commencement of the proceedings.
An attorney in the audience has thrown a curve to the panel by suggesting that an effort to contact the unit owner may constitute a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. The panelists are acknowledging that to be a "fair point"; Mr. Postman is attempting (unsuccessfully in my humble opinion), to draw a distinction between "gathering infromation" and commencing collection proceedings.
Ms. Schraff has reminded all of the participants that CAI's listing of Rights and Responsibilities calls for foreclosure to be used only as a last resort...
All of the panelists are encouraging the obtaining of directors and officers coverage.
Now the panel is discussing the transfer of collection rights to debt collectors; the panel is rightly warning Associations to carefully scrutinize these relationships to make certain that the Board is not improperly delegating its responsibilities. And, they are all advising, make certain that the parties making these offers are not looking primarily to their own interests.
Thursday, April 23, 2009
Bare Coverage in New Orleans
The first session that I'm attending today is entitled "Bare Walls, Bare Coverage? -- The Great Coverage Debate. The subject matter is insurance, not Bourbon Street.
The most interesting new knowledge to me is that Fannie Mae is essentially requiring HO-6 coverage in connection with mortgages. Additionally, FNMA regulations which have long required reserves for deductibles, are beginning to be enforced; that is impracticable for many associations which are carrying larger deductibles as a means of having adequate insurance.
Another main focus of the session is the fallout from a recent Maryland case, Anderson vs. Gables on Tuckerman, which led to insurance legislation. In that case, in an opinion which reached a similarly absurd result as the Flores v. Earnshaw case, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled, as explained by Robin Manougian, CIRMS:
Ms. Manougian further explained:
The insurance industry and Maryland's CAI Legislative Action Committee sponsored and managed to get legislation passed that will fix the result, by allowing associations, through their master policy, to insure the units and the betterments therein.
The most interesting new knowledge to me is that Fannie Mae is essentially requiring HO-6 coverage in connection with mortgages. Additionally, FNMA regulations which have long required reserves for deductibles, are beginning to be enforced; that is impracticable for many associations which are carrying larger deductibles as a means of having adequate insurance.
Another main focus of the session is the fallout from a recent Maryland case, Anderson vs. Gables on Tuckerman, which led to insurance legislation. In that case, in an opinion which reached a similarly absurd result as the Flores v. Earnshaw case, the Maryland Court of Appeals ruled, as explained by Robin Manougian, CIRMS:
“the Maryland Condominium Act does not require the council of unit owners to repair or replace property of an owner in an individual condominium unit after a casualty loss.” The basis of the Court ruling [was] its conclusion that the Condominium Act requires the unit owner to make all repairs to the unit regardless of the cause of the damage."
Ms. Manougian further explained:
The vast majority of the Condominiums that our Agency insures (and by and large associations insured throughout Maryland) want to maintain traditional Single Entity coverage – master policy property insurance that covers the units, minus improvements and betterments made or acquired by the unit owners. This continues to be the best way to insure condominium associations because of:
-- The interdependency of the units to the common elements
-- The difficulty of adjusting losses between two or more adjusters – one for the association to the extent common elements are damaged, and one or more for the unit owners depending on the number of units affected at time of loss.
-- The insurable interest that the Association effectively has in the units. If the units are not properly insured, uninsured or underinsured losses affecting the units can impact value, adversely affecting the entire property.
-- Certificates of Insurance: The lenders have not reacted en mass as of this writing. Some have contacted us to verify that either Single Entity of Bare Walls coverage is in place. We suspect these calls will increase with time, and this means that they will look for affirmation of master policy unit coverage, or will begin requiring two certificates: One from the Condominium Association, and one from the unit owner.
-- Overall Costs. Single Entity coverage allows the unit owners to buy unit coverage in bulk. The overall replacement value, even if bare walls coverage is rendered, will not change much if at all, which means the premium for the Master Policy will not change, while the premiums for HO-6 based on increased dwelling coverage will increase.
-- The Maryland Condominium Act does not require that owners carry HO-6.* (see Fannie Mae requirement effective March 01, 2009)
-- Even if HO-6 coverage is carried, the possibility exists that unit owners will fail to have or maintain unit/dwelling coverage at full replacement value at time of
loss.
The insurance industry and Maryland's CAI Legislative Action Committee sponsored and managed to get legislation passed that will fix the result, by allowing associations, through their master policy, to insure the units and the betterments therein.
Live Blogging the CAI Conference -- Day 1
I'm at the Community Association Institute's National Conference, and will be live-blogging some of the conference proceedings the next couple of days.
Wednesday, April 22, 2009
Happy Earth Day!
I'm in New Orleans this week for a Foundation for Community Association Research strategic planning meeting and the Community Association Institute's National Conference; one of the conference highlights (at least in my opinion) is the release of the Foundation's Best Practices Report on Green Communities. It's the culmination of a project that I and others have been working on for many months; it will be available, soon, for free pdf downloads. I'll give you a link, as soon as it's available.
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
You Wanted a Toilet in Your Condominium?
The Utah Court of Appeals, in an opinion last week, came out with a rather absurd result in a dispute between a condominium developer and unit purchaser.
The case, Flores v. Earnshaw, involved Mr. Seadhna Flores' purchase of a yet-to-be-built condominium unit. Mr. Earnshaw and Mr. Flores both signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) which called for a purchase price of "$144,950, less the $10,000 previously paid when Flores had exercised the earlier Option Agreement." About a month later, Earnshaw called "to express concern about the selling price..." Earnshaw sought to revise the contract to increase the price of the unit to $179,950; Flores rejected this offer, and ultimately sued, seeking specific performance of the contract.
Following a trial, the trial court decided that the contract was ambiguous as to whether the parties intended to convey a fully built-out unit, or just a shell of a unit. The court found that the form language in section 1.l was ambiguous, and considered evidence outside of the contract to ascertain the parties' intent. The court thus ordered the sale of a fully built out for $144,850. Earnshaw appealed.
The issue addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals involved whether or not the trial court was correct in allowing and considering the evidence outside of the contract. Ultimately, the court concluded that the court could only look to the contract to determine if it was ambiguous; it the contract itself did not appear ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence should be excluded. Looking only at section 1.1, the court found no ambiguity. Unfortunately for Mr. Flores, that section called for inclusion of "plumbing, heating and air conditioning fixtures, and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies, and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs," only to the extent that they were presently owned and attached to the property. Because none of the items were "owned and attached" as of the date of the contract, the court found the language unambiguous, and held that the admission of the extrinsic evidence was improper. Thus the court remanded the case (sent it back to the trial court) "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
This is, obviously, an absurd result even if the case was decided correctly pursuant to evidentiary rules. There is no doubt, when the extrinsic evidence is considered, that Flores was expecting to buy, and Earnshaw originally intended to sell, a completed unit, with toilets and appliances. The court noted that the parties (and presumably the real estate agents, erred by using an REPC for completed construction. That fact, while true, is of little consolation to Mr. Flores.
The appellate court gave a few hints, and possible solutions, to Flores, in noting that the existence of an ambiguity can be found by reviewing the "contract taken as a whole." Furthermore, the court noted that the parties had not argued "mutual mistake, reformation, impossibility or any other theory to support their positions."
At this point, Mr. Flores and his counsel have the option to ask the Utah Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision, or they can try to get the trial court's reconsideration as to whether the contract, as a whole is ambiguous; Mr. Flores and his counsel could also seek to pursue some of the other theories suggested by the trial court. That may or may not be successful, depending upon the posture of the case.
This case should serve as a reminder of several things; the need for the assistance of competent advice in the purchase of property, the need to deal with an honest and reputable builder, and the need to carefully evaluate and pursue all legal options and theories when everything else fails. Although I had no familiarity with the case prior to last Thursday, (when the opinion was issued), I strongly suspect that the attorneys fees incurred by both both parties likely approached or exceeded the $35,000 difference in the original and proposed purchase price. And now, they get to go back to the trial court to fight some more.
The case, Flores v. Earnshaw, involved Mr. Seadhna Flores' purchase of a yet-to-be-built condominium unit. Mr. Earnshaw and Mr. Flores both signed a Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) which called for a purchase price of "$144,950, less the $10,000 previously paid when Flores had exercised the earlier Option Agreement." About a month later, Earnshaw called "to express concern about the selling price..." Earnshaw sought to revise the contract to increase the price of the unit to $179,950; Flores rejected this offer, and ultimately sued, seeking specific performance of the contract.
Following a trial, the trial court decided that the contract was ambiguous as to whether the parties intended to convey a fully built-out unit, or just a shell of a unit. The court found that the form language in section 1.l was ambiguous, and considered evidence outside of the contract to ascertain the parties' intent. The court thus ordered the sale of a fully built out for $144,850. Earnshaw appealed.
The issue addressed by the Utah Court of Appeals involved whether or not the trial court was correct in allowing and considering the evidence outside of the contract. Ultimately, the court concluded that the court could only look to the contract to determine if it was ambiguous; it the contract itself did not appear ambiguous, the extrinsic evidence should be excluded. Looking only at section 1.1, the court found no ambiguity. Unfortunately for Mr. Flores, that section called for inclusion of "plumbing, heating and air conditioning fixtures, and equipment; ceiling fans; water heater; built-in appliances; light fixtures and bulbs; bathroom fixtures; curtains, draperies, and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows; window blinds; awnings; installed television antenna; satellite dishes and system; permanently affixed carpets; automatic garage door opener and accompanying transmitter(s); fencing; and trees and shrubs," only to the extent that they were presently owned and attached to the property. Because none of the items were "owned and attached" as of the date of the contract, the court found the language unambiguous, and held that the admission of the extrinsic evidence was improper. Thus the court remanded the case (sent it back to the trial court) "for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."
This is, obviously, an absurd result even if the case was decided correctly pursuant to evidentiary rules. There is no doubt, when the extrinsic evidence is considered, that Flores was expecting to buy, and Earnshaw originally intended to sell, a completed unit, with toilets and appliances. The court noted that the parties (and presumably the real estate agents, erred by using an REPC for completed construction. That fact, while true, is of little consolation to Mr. Flores.
The appellate court gave a few hints, and possible solutions, to Flores, in noting that the existence of an ambiguity can be found by reviewing the "contract taken as a whole." Furthermore, the court noted that the parties had not argued "mutual mistake, reformation, impossibility or any other theory to support their positions."
At this point, Mr. Flores and his counsel have the option to ask the Utah Supreme Court to review the Court of Appeals' decision, or they can try to get the trial court's reconsideration as to whether the contract, as a whole is ambiguous; Mr. Flores and his counsel could also seek to pursue some of the other theories suggested by the trial court. That may or may not be successful, depending upon the posture of the case.
This case should serve as a reminder of several things; the need for the assistance of competent advice in the purchase of property, the need to deal with an honest and reputable builder, and the need to carefully evaluate and pursue all legal options and theories when everything else fails. Although I had no familiarity with the case prior to last Thursday, (when the opinion was issued), I strongly suspect that the attorneys fees incurred by both both parties likely approached or exceeded the $35,000 difference in the original and proposed purchase price. And now, they get to go back to the trial court to fight some more.
Friday, April 03, 2009
Legislative Update Forthcoming
Regular readers will notice that my legislative tracking widget is no longer posted; with the adjournment of the legislature, it seems rather meaningless.
Of the bills being watched, only HB 243 survived; that bill dealt with "Rental Restrictions on Condominiums and Common Interest Communities". A couple of readers and clients have asked for my thoughts on that; unfortunately, I haven't had time to read and consider it. It is, however, on my "short list", and I'll update on it and other legislation of note in an upcoming blog.
Of the bills being watched, only HB 243 survived; that bill dealt with "Rental Restrictions on Condominiums and Common Interest Communities". A couple of readers and clients have asked for my thoughts on that; unfortunately, I haven't had time to read and consider it. It is, however, on my "short list", and I'll update on it and other legislation of note in an upcoming blog.
Live Blogging The Managers' Munch -- Rentals
I'm attending the Utah Chapter of the Community Association Institute's monthly Manager's Munch today; the subject is Rentals in Community Associations. The first speaker, Paul Smith of the Utah Apartment Association is advocating the regulation, but not the prohibition of, rentals in associations.
Paul recommends using a local, attorney-reviewed lease contract; he also recommends that the board suggest the screening, by owners, of the potential tenants. If you do that, he says, make certain that the information regarding tenants is kept confidential. Next, require owners to identify their tenants.
Paul suggests that tenants should also be kept abreast of the owners' deficiencies; he suggests that associations advise tenants of pending amenity disruptions. Leases should inform unit owners of the association's governing documents.
According to Paul, cities are actively encouraging participation in the Good Landlord programs, in which municipalities provide disproportionate fees for non-participating landlords, in order to encourage training and education.
Paul contends that most cities won't touch a definition of a family; that's the first matter upon which he and I differ significantly. I suggest that my associations look to and incorporate those definitions into their restrictions; Paul's co-presenter, Kirk Cullimore more or less retracted that assertion.
Now Kirk Cullimore is up, taking on the difficult task of attempting to explain conflicts and overlaps between municipality, state and federal laws. His advice, with which I agree, is that you find the most restrictive requirement, and comply with it.
Kirk recommends that associations should inspect units more than they traditionally have. He suggests that utility companies may be willing to provide information as to the recipients of bills. Kirk also suggests using the state DMV database; I'd recommend extreme caution in that area, because the subscription agreement on that information contains significant limitations on its proper and improper use.
Kirk is now talking of nuisance evictions; he contends (and I agree) that they are difficult in Utah. A "three day comply and vacate" notice is often ineffective by itself; even if it's not, they make a good trail, and can lead to the service of what Kirk calls a "Three Day Get the Hell Out" notice. (I like that term, but probably wouldn't put it on a pleading...)
Kirk suggests a required lease addendum for the community; I agree that this approach is superior to the imposition of a form lease.
Paul recommends using a local, attorney-reviewed lease contract; he also recommends that the board suggest the screening, by owners, of the potential tenants. If you do that, he says, make certain that the information regarding tenants is kept confidential. Next, require owners to identify their tenants.
Paul suggests that tenants should also be kept abreast of the owners' deficiencies; he suggests that associations advise tenants of pending amenity disruptions. Leases should inform unit owners of the association's governing documents.
According to Paul, cities are actively encouraging participation in the Good Landlord programs, in which municipalities provide disproportionate fees for non-participating landlords, in order to encourage training and education.
Paul contends that most cities won't touch a definition of a family; that's the first matter upon which he and I differ significantly. I suggest that my associations look to and incorporate those definitions into their restrictions; Paul's co-presenter, Kirk Cullimore more or less retracted that assertion.
Now Kirk Cullimore is up, taking on the difficult task of attempting to explain conflicts and overlaps between municipality, state and federal laws. His advice, with which I agree, is that you find the most restrictive requirement, and comply with it.
Kirk recommends that associations should inspect units more than they traditionally have. He suggests that utility companies may be willing to provide information as to the recipients of bills. Kirk also suggests using the state DMV database; I'd recommend extreme caution in that area, because the subscription agreement on that information contains significant limitations on its proper and improper use.
Kirk is now talking of nuisance evictions; he contends (and I agree) that they are difficult in Utah. A "three day comply and vacate" notice is often ineffective by itself; even if it's not, they make a good trail, and can lead to the service of what Kirk calls a "Three Day Get the Hell Out" notice. (I like that term, but probably wouldn't put it on a pleading...)
Kirk suggests a required lease addendum for the community; I agree that this approach is superior to the imposition of a form lease.
Thursday, April 02, 2009
Rental Restrictions in Bylaws?
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in an opinion released last Friday, issued an opinion which affirms the validity of rental restrictions included in a community association's bylaws, as opposed to the association's declaration. Several courts around the country have dealt with this issue in the past several years, with opinions coming down on both sides of the issue. And in this case, the Court was divided, with a dissenting justice arguing that the amendment to the bylaws were contrary to the declaration and the statutes, and that the restrictions needed to adopted, if at all, as an amendment to the declaration.
The case, Apple Valley Gardens Association, Inc. v. MacHutta, involved an association formed in July of 1979, by Steven MacHutta (yes, that MacHutta). The original declaration included a sentence providing that "Any lease...shall not relieve an owner from his obligation to pay common expenses or any other obligations..."
In 2002, the Association members amended the Association's bylaws to prohibit rental of units. Ms. MacHutta, the declarant's spouse was renting her unit, and challenged the amendment. Existing tenancies were "grandfathered", as the dispute did not ripen until 2004, when the board refused her petition to enter into a lease with a new tenant. Nonetheless, she rented the Unit and the Association sued.
The Court framed the first question as to whether lease restrictions must be included in the declaration; the court held that the rental restriction fell within the statutory provision providing that bylaws could include "any restriction on or requirement respecting the use and maintenance of the units...," which the Court held could include rental restrictions.
The Court next held that the provision respecting the joint liability of owners for assessments, by allowing leases, was contrary to the restriction against leases.
"Condominium ownership is a statutory creation that obligates individual owners to relinquish rights that they might otherwise enjoy in othr types of real property ownership", the Court stated. Amendments to the bylaws were foreseeable and enforceable, even if not as readily discoverable by virtue of recordation, and even if more easily achievable than declaration amendments. "The fact that lenders and purchasers rely on recorded declarations is irrelevant. If lenders and purchasers wish to know whether and under what conditions a condominium unit may be rented out, they may easily inquire as to both the declaration and the bylaws."
Next, the Court held that the declaration's reference to the conditions under which leases must be made did not mandate that they be allowed. The Court stated: "this provision neither grants a right to rent one's unit nor prohibits it..."
Lastly, the court dismissed a statutory-based challenge to the provision, holding that a marketability statute did not prohibit the bylaw.
The dissent disagreed, arguing first that restrictions such as rental restrictions must be in the declaration to be valid. Furthermore, the dissent argued, the amendment was contrary to, and hence prohibited by, the Declaration.
Apple Valley provides support for the Association that cannot, for whatever reason, provide rental restrictions in a declaration as opposed to bylaws. Nonetheless, this author, and the majority of practitioners in the area, encourage associations to make such significant changes in the declaration, rather than the bylaws.
The case, Apple Valley Gardens Association, Inc. v. MacHutta, involved an association formed in July of 1979, by Steven MacHutta (yes, that MacHutta). The original declaration included a sentence providing that "Any lease...shall not relieve an owner from his obligation to pay common expenses or any other obligations..."
In 2002, the Association members amended the Association's bylaws to prohibit rental of units. Ms. MacHutta, the declarant's spouse was renting her unit, and challenged the amendment. Existing tenancies were "grandfathered", as the dispute did not ripen until 2004, when the board refused her petition to enter into a lease with a new tenant. Nonetheless, she rented the Unit and the Association sued.
The Court framed the first question as to whether lease restrictions must be included in the declaration; the court held that the rental restriction fell within the statutory provision providing that bylaws could include "any restriction on or requirement respecting the use and maintenance of the units...," which the Court held could include rental restrictions.
The Court next held that the provision respecting the joint liability of owners for assessments, by allowing leases, was contrary to the restriction against leases.
"Condominium ownership is a statutory creation that obligates individual owners to relinquish rights that they might otherwise enjoy in othr types of real property ownership", the Court stated. Amendments to the bylaws were foreseeable and enforceable, even if not as readily discoverable by virtue of recordation, and even if more easily achievable than declaration amendments. "The fact that lenders and purchasers rely on recorded declarations is irrelevant. If lenders and purchasers wish to know whether and under what conditions a condominium unit may be rented out, they may easily inquire as to both the declaration and the bylaws."
Next, the Court held that the declaration's reference to the conditions under which leases must be made did not mandate that they be allowed. The Court stated: "this provision neither grants a right to rent one's unit nor prohibits it..."
Lastly, the court dismissed a statutory-based challenge to the provision, holding that a marketability statute did not prohibit the bylaw.
The dissent disagreed, arguing first that restrictions such as rental restrictions must be in the declaration to be valid. Furthermore, the dissent argued, the amendment was contrary to, and hence prohibited by, the Declaration.
Apple Valley provides support for the Association that cannot, for whatever reason, provide rental restrictions in a declaration as opposed to bylaws. Nonetheless, this author, and the majority of practitioners in the area, encourage associations to make such significant changes in the declaration, rather than the bylaws.
Wednesday, April 01, 2009
Abandoned...
Monday's New York Times had an article on the continued (and apparently increasing) tendency of lenders to walk from properties, rather than foreclose on them.
This article, however, reveals a new twist to the problem: the owners, who think their homes have been foreclosed, are being charged by municipalities for the clean up, and sometimes the demolition of, these residences. So it's not just community associations that are facing non-responsive lenders, but also the owners of those units. Previous posts on this blog have advocated vigilance in the monitoring of units in this day and age; this gives another reason. And just because a lender threatens foreclosure, don't assume it will be completed.
Tuesday, March 24, 2009
Pet, or Service Animal? (Again...)
A new Florida Federal District Court case has some good reasoning and guidance dealing with the pet vs. service animal distinction, and how an association should respond to requests for a service animal accommodation.
The case, Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condominium Association, involved the Davis C. Hawn's assertion that his Labrador retriever, Booster, was a service animal who was "dually trained to help [Mr. Hawn] both physically and psychologically.
Booster was originally introduced to the association's board as a "pet", and Mr. Hawn sought a six month trial period "to give folks a chance to prove that they love their pets as onel would love any other family member." There's no evidence that the association did anything in response to this letter, but about a year later, Mr. Hawn sought permission to keep Booster as his "service animal". His letter asserted physical and psychological disabilities, supported by a letter from a psychologist and a chiropractor.
The association thereafter attempted on two different occasions to get more information regarding Mr. Hawn's alleged handicap; no further information was provided. As a result, the association sent a letter stating "at this time, we must deny your request..."; Mr. Hawn responded by filing a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The FHCR ultimately found in favor of Mr. Hawn; following that, he filed his claim in the Florida Federal District Court, alleging violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act and the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Haws had failed to meet his burdens. The court, while assuming that Hawns was handicapped, found for the association based upon the fact that the association had no knowledge or reason to know that he was, in fact handicapped. The court noted that the association had never denied the accommodation, but rather had twice requested -- unsuccessfully -- to obtain additional evidence of the handicap and/or the need for the accommodation.
The court, in its opinion, reviewed and relied extensively upon a Hawaii case of several years ago, Prindable v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F.Supp.2d 1245 (D. Hawaii 2003), affirmed, Dubois v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2006). The Prindable/Dubois case, like this case, involved a patient association which sought, unsuccessfully, to receive medical evidence to support the need for an alleged service animal.
Haws provides strong support for associations' rights to request competent evidence for the need for a requested service animal. In those instances where the need for a service animal is not obvious, associations can and should insist upon adequate and appropriate medical evidence, so that legitimate requests for accommodation are granted, and unwarranted requests are denied.
The case, Hawn v. Shoreline Towers Phase 1 Condominium Association, involved the Davis C. Hawn's assertion that his Labrador retriever, Booster, was a service animal who was "dually trained to help [Mr. Hawn] both physically and psychologically.
Booster was originally introduced to the association's board as a "pet", and Mr. Hawn sought a six month trial period "to give folks a chance to prove that they love their pets as onel would love any other family member." There's no evidence that the association did anything in response to this letter, but about a year later, Mr. Hawn sought permission to keep Booster as his "service animal". His letter asserted physical and psychological disabilities, supported by a letter from a psychologist and a chiropractor.
The association thereafter attempted on two different occasions to get more information regarding Mr. Hawn's alleged handicap; no further information was provided. As a result, the association sent a letter stating "at this time, we must deny your request..."; Mr. Hawn responded by filing a complaint with the Florida Commission on Human Relations (FCHR). The FHCR ultimately found in favor of Mr. Hawn; following that, he filed his claim in the Florida Federal District Court, alleging violation of the Federal Fair Housing Act and the intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress.
The defendants moved for summary judgment, contending that Haws had failed to meet his burdens. The court, while assuming that Hawns was handicapped, found for the association based upon the fact that the association had no knowledge or reason to know that he was, in fact handicapped. The court noted that the association had never denied the accommodation, but rather had twice requested -- unsuccessfully -- to obtain additional evidence of the handicap and/or the need for the accommodation.
The court, in its opinion, reviewed and relied extensively upon a Hawaii case of several years ago, Prindable v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 304 F.Supp.2d 1245 (D. Hawaii 2003), affirmed, Dubois v. Association of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2006). The Prindable/Dubois case, like this case, involved a patient association which sought, unsuccessfully, to receive medical evidence to support the need for an alleged service animal.
Haws provides strong support for associations' rights to request competent evidence for the need for a requested service animal. In those instances where the need for a service animal is not obvious, associations can and should insist upon adequate and appropriate medical evidence, so that legitimate requests for accommodation are granted, and unwarranted requests are denied.
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Live Blogging -- The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Several of my colleagues in the office are gathered in the conference room, listening excitedly to a seminar on the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (the "Act"). Since I know that so many of you are interested in the subject, I'm going to live blog it.
The presenter, J. Scott Watson, is regaling the audience by letting us know that he knew (and worked for) Mr. Lieberman (presumably not Joe), who was the defendant in the leading case which established that lawyers are "debt collectors", under the Act.
A creditor, collecting its debts in the name of another, will be responsible for its conduct in connection with the collection of debts. In other words, an association whose representative uses a name other than the association, may be imposing the association and himself or herself to liability.
All debt collectors, including attorneys, are precluded from contacting debtors who are known to be represented by counsel. This is a non-issue to lawyers, as the Rules of Professional Conduct otherwise preclude such conduct.
The speaker suggests "reading the act in its entirety..."
A case called Foti established that a message on a voice mail, without the purpose of the call, violated the Act. On the other hand, identification of the reason for the call would be a violation, assuming a third party answered the call. The suggestion.
The speaker offers no suggestions; my suggestion -- don't leave messages on voice mail machines.
Never discuss a debt with anyone other than the debtor. If you are seeking someone's location from a third party (which is allowed under a specific exemption), don't disclose the reason for your inquiry. If someone contacts you purporting to be counsel for a debtor, request confirmation in writing, before proceeding.
Calling a deadbeat (er, I mean debtor) at work can be a real problem.
If a debtor requests that the debt collector cease collection activities, the debt collector must stop; the only exception will be the pursuit of judicial proceedings.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the Act is the "least sophisticated debtor"; that requires that communications cannot be confusing to the least sophisticated debtor. That is, needless to say, a pretty low standard.
A new trend in litigation, according to the speaker, is suits arising from efforts to collect an amount that the debtor is not entitled to. For this reason, associations and managers must use extreme caution in referring collections to make certain that the information conveyed is accurate.
The recent Hicks case, from Florida, involved Section 1692; the debtor alleged that the voice mail messages were improper, in that they did not disclose the debtor's identity, and the purpose of the call. The message said, "this is in regard to a personal matter...." The court certified a class action, based upon the assumption that the auto-dialer had most likely called a large number of individuals.
Campuzano involved a letter being sent, with the necessary warnings; it made an "offer" of a discount, for a quick call. The plaintiff suggested that it was deceptive in that the officer who had purportedly signed the letters had not actually been involved; the court noted that the officers of the company did not need to have personal knowledge of the letters in order to avoid liability. The court noted that the executives were not lawyers, suggesting a different standard for lawyers.
In McKinney v. Cadleway Properties, Inc., the court addressed the status of a successor who had acquired a debt; the successor will be treated as a debt collector.
Romano case involved an attempted call to Ruben Romano; he was speaking to Ruben, Sr., rather than Ruben, Jr. The discussion with the father disclosed the debt to the son. Either the speaker didn't say, or I didn't catch, what the court did under those facts. I'll track it down, and supplement.
Fogel involved the collection of student loans from a law school graduate (oops!); the lawsuit was filed in the district of the primary Rutgers campus, which was in a different county than the law school, and the residence of the graduate. Again, I'll follow up with the result.
Interesting question for the end of the seminar: If you have two debtors, should you send a letter to both? The speaker advises yes. That, of course, leads to another question; if you do so, can you bill for both?
The presenter, J. Scott Watson, is regaling the audience by letting us know that he knew (and worked for) Mr. Lieberman (presumably not Joe), who was the defendant in the leading case which established that lawyers are "debt collectors", under the Act.
A creditor, collecting its debts in the name of another, will be responsible for its conduct in connection with the collection of debts. In other words, an association whose representative uses a name other than the association, may be imposing the association and himself or herself to liability.
All debt collectors, including attorneys, are precluded from contacting debtors who are known to be represented by counsel. This is a non-issue to lawyers, as the Rules of Professional Conduct otherwise preclude such conduct.
The speaker suggests "reading the act in its entirety..."
A case called Foti established that a message on a voice mail, without the purpose of the call, violated the Act. On the other hand, identification of the reason for the call would be a violation, assuming a third party answered the call. The suggestion.
The speaker offers no suggestions; my suggestion -- don't leave messages on voice mail machines.
Never discuss a debt with anyone other than the debtor. If you are seeking someone's location from a third party (which is allowed under a specific exemption), don't disclose the reason for your inquiry. If someone contacts you purporting to be counsel for a debtor, request confirmation in writing, before proceeding.
Calling a deadbeat (er, I mean debtor) at work can be a real problem.
If a debtor requests that the debt collector cease collection activities, the debt collector must stop; the only exception will be the pursuit of judicial proceedings.
Perhaps the most troublesome aspect of the Act is the "least sophisticated debtor"; that requires that communications cannot be confusing to the least sophisticated debtor. That is, needless to say, a pretty low standard.
A new trend in litigation, according to the speaker, is suits arising from efforts to collect an amount that the debtor is not entitled to. For this reason, associations and managers must use extreme caution in referring collections to make certain that the information conveyed is accurate.
The recent Hicks case, from Florida, involved Section 1692; the debtor alleged that the voice mail messages were improper, in that they did not disclose the debtor's identity, and the purpose of the call. The message said, "this is in regard to a personal matter...." The court certified a class action, based upon the assumption that the auto-dialer had most likely called a large number of individuals.
Campuzano involved a letter being sent, with the necessary warnings; it made an "offer" of a discount, for a quick call. The plaintiff suggested that it was deceptive in that the officer who had purportedly signed the letters had not actually been involved; the court noted that the officers of the company did not need to have personal knowledge of the letters in order to avoid liability. The court noted that the executives were not lawyers, suggesting a different standard for lawyers.
In McKinney v. Cadleway Properties, Inc., the court addressed the status of a successor who had acquired a debt; the successor will be treated as a debt collector.
Romano case involved an attempted call to Ruben Romano; he was speaking to Ruben, Sr., rather than Ruben, Jr. The discussion with the father disclosed the debt to the son. Either the speaker didn't say, or I didn't catch, what the court did under those facts. I'll track it down, and supplement.
Fogel involved the collection of student loans from a law school graduate (oops!); the lawsuit was filed in the district of the primary Rutgers campus, which was in a different county than the law school, and the residence of the graduate. Again, I'll follow up with the result.
Interesting question for the end of the seminar: If you have two debtors, should you send a letter to both? The speaker advises yes. That, of course, leads to another question; if you do so, can you bill for both?
Friday, March 06, 2009
What's a Short Sale?
I'm live blogging today from the UCCAI Manager's Munch; the topic of the day is -- you guessed it -- the economy. More specifically, "The Effects of Short Sales and Foreclosures on Homeowners' Associations".
The speaker is Paul Newton, Backman Title Services.
Paul's beginning with an explanation of "race notice" -- the concept that the first to record their property interest will have priority.
Utah's Condominium Act provides priority to mortgage holders over association liens in condominiums; in the HOA setting, there was no law prior to 2004. Nonetheless, most declarations (in HOAs and condominiums) provide similar protections to lenders.
Backman's office was opening 150 foreclosure files a month in 2007; now it's a thousand per month.
Paul appropriately points out that the language of a declaration is critical respecting the association's rights; some declarations give priority to first mortgages; others give priority to all mortgages. Needless to say, at least for a while, that's a significant issue.
Another good point arises with respect to the "due date" of assessments in non-condominium associations. Most declarations have assessments on an annual basis. If assessments become due on the first of the year, but are billed monthly thereafter, the association may have priority relating back to January 1. Careful lenders avoid this predicament by receiving a payoff, and assuring that assessments are current at the time of transfer.
Paul says that their company appreciates the filing of a new lien, even post-foreclosure, so that the title companies know whom to contact. John Morris questions whether the filing of a lien against lenders may create a "selective enforcment" issue. That's a good point; a solution to that may be an amendment to the association's debt collection policy; a policy distinction which is reasonable should eliminate that argument.
John Richards inquired about how to pursue lenders who don't take care of their property; Paul recommends contacting the lender at the address on the deed, and the trustee who conducted the sale. (There are a lot of very busy foreclosure lawyers who will really enjoy that additional mail.)
A short sale, as defined by Paul, involves a proposal for a sale where not all lienholders will be made whole; the first lienholder will dictate who gets what, and the title company must close within those parameters. Obviously, the frequency of these short sales is increasing.
The speaker is Paul Newton, Backman Title Services.
Paul's beginning with an explanation of "race notice" -- the concept that the first to record their property interest will have priority.
Utah's Condominium Act provides priority to mortgage holders over association liens in condominiums; in the HOA setting, there was no law prior to 2004. Nonetheless, most declarations (in HOAs and condominiums) provide similar protections to lenders.
Backman's office was opening 150 foreclosure files a month in 2007; now it's a thousand per month.
Paul appropriately points out that the language of a declaration is critical respecting the association's rights; some declarations give priority to first mortgages; others give priority to all mortgages. Needless to say, at least for a while, that's a significant issue.
Another good point arises with respect to the "due date" of assessments in non-condominium associations. Most declarations have assessments on an annual basis. If assessments become due on the first of the year, but are billed monthly thereafter, the association may have priority relating back to January 1. Careful lenders avoid this predicament by receiving a payoff, and assuring that assessments are current at the time of transfer.
Paul says that their company appreciates the filing of a new lien, even post-foreclosure, so that the title companies know whom to contact. John Morris questions whether the filing of a lien against lenders may create a "selective enforcment" issue. That's a good point; a solution to that may be an amendment to the association's debt collection policy; a policy distinction which is reasonable should eliminate that argument.
John Richards inquired about how to pursue lenders who don't take care of their property; Paul recommends contacting the lender at the address on the deed, and the trustee who conducted the sale. (There are a lot of very busy foreclosure lawyers who will really enjoy that additional mail.)
A short sale, as defined by Paul, involves a proposal for a sale where not all lienholders will be made whole; the first lienholder will dictate who gets what, and the title company must close within those parameters. Obviously, the frequency of these short sales is increasing.
Mortgage Cram-Down Update
Last night, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.R. 1106, allowing for bankruptcy court intervention in renegotiating the terms of certain mortgages. The bill does not directly refer to association's, but CAI's Public Affairs team was (and is) encouraging community association leaders to follow the legislation, and share your concerns about the potential of interference with community association assessments. Here's a snippet of the info sent from CAI this morning:
I'll post updates here on this blog, and on the www.utahcondolaw.com parent page, and on our new collection site, www.caalrs.com
On Thursday, March 5, the House of Representatives passed HR 1106 with some technical amendments by a vote of 234 to 191. Although the concerns raised by CAI and others have not yet been fully resolved, your efforts in expressing concern have helped us get Congress’s attention, and members of the Judiciary Committee have committed to work with us to clarify and address these issues.
CAI continues to have concerns that the legislation will have a negative impact on associations in states with priority assessment liens, and that the grant of authority to bankruptcy courts, absent clearer direction and limitations, may be used to modify a homeowner’s assessment obligations to his/her community association. Again, thanks to your efforts, Congress is now aware of these issues and we will continue to work with legislators as the bill moves into the Senate.
Your efforts will help us ensure that this legislation will not have negative unintended consequences for common interest communities across the country and the residents who are current in their assessments. A well-crafted plan, that helps those in distress while protecting those who are current, will benefit us all.
I'll post updates here on this blog, and on the www.utahcondolaw.com parent page, and on our new collection site, www.caalrs.com
Friday, February 27, 2009
The End of the Line...
...as far as we go...
regular TRAX riders will understand that reference. I invite the rest of you to take a ride on TRAX, so you can catch it.
The End of the Line
Julie Ladle and I had a meeting out at Daybreak today; while we were there, I wanted to visit the terminus of the rails of the new Mid-Jordan TRAX line to Daybreak.
When completed (currently anticipated to be sometime in 2011-12), the spur will travel from Daybreak to the Fashion Place (6400 South) Station, where it will connect to trains running to Downtown, and ultimately to West Valley City, the Airport, and the University of Utah.
The course to Daybreak will be rather indirect, but it will allow many other residents to avoid the need to fight traffic and dump carbon into the atmosphere. This link will take you to the latest information on the progress of this extension.
regular TRAX riders will understand that reference. I invite the rest of you to take a ride on TRAX, so you can catch it.
The End of the LineJulie Ladle and I had a meeting out at Daybreak today; while we were there, I wanted to visit the terminus of the rails of the new Mid-Jordan TRAX line to Daybreak.
When completed (currently anticipated to be sometime in 2011-12), the spur will travel from Daybreak to the Fashion Place (6400 South) Station, where it will connect to trains running to Downtown, and ultimately to West Valley City, the Airport, and the University of Utah.
The course to Daybreak will be rather indirect, but it will allow many other residents to avoid the need to fight traffic and dump carbon into the atmosphere. This link will take you to the latest information on the progress of this extension.
Thursday, February 26, 2009
No More Non-Judicial Foreclosures?
Those who know me, and those who follow this blog, are aware that I've never been an advocate of non-judicial foreclosures of community association assessment liens. And at the the CCAL Law Conference last month, the pundits were agreeing.
I've had a number of reasons to dislike nonjudicial foreclosures; I think they usually take longer than a letter followed (when necessary) by a complaint; I think they are unduly aggressive in a number of situations; I think they unduly impose excessive costs on the association and ultimately the unit owner, and I've always questioned their legality under Utah statutes. And now, there's published evidence that confirms that a Utah trial court has found them problematic, and an appelate court won't review that decision, at least for now.
The case, McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Association, Inc., involved challenges on a number of grounds to the legitimacy of a condominium non-judicial foreclosure; the trial court essentially held that ambiguities and omissions in the Utah Condominium Act would not justify the absence of a "trustee" in a nonjudicial foreclosure, and hence the attempted sale by the association's counsel was set aside. The association's counsel appealed, but that appeal was very quickly rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals, based upon the absence of a "final ruling" from which the association was appealing. Remaining controversies between the parties preclude consideration of the appeal at this time; I strongly suspect that the costs of further litigation will preclude further litigation and the eventual appeal.
I think it's a very important case; we'll be exploring it in more depth in connection with an upcoming CAALRS collection seminar. Keep an eye on this blog, and/or Utahcondolaw.com for information on the date, time and other subjects to be covered.
CAALRS, Utahcondolaw.com and this blog are all sponsored by the law firm of Hobbs & Olson, L.C.
I've had a number of reasons to dislike nonjudicial foreclosures; I think they usually take longer than a letter followed (when necessary) by a complaint; I think they are unduly aggressive in a number of situations; I think they unduly impose excessive costs on the association and ultimately the unit owner, and I've always questioned their legality under Utah statutes. And now, there's published evidence that confirms that a Utah trial court has found them problematic, and an appelate court won't review that decision, at least for now.
The case, McQueen v. Jordan Pines Townhomes Owners Association, Inc., involved challenges on a number of grounds to the legitimacy of a condominium non-judicial foreclosure; the trial court essentially held that ambiguities and omissions in the Utah Condominium Act would not justify the absence of a "trustee" in a nonjudicial foreclosure, and hence the attempted sale by the association's counsel was set aside. The association's counsel appealed, but that appeal was very quickly rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals, based upon the absence of a "final ruling" from which the association was appealing. Remaining controversies between the parties preclude consideration of the appeal at this time; I strongly suspect that the costs of further litigation will preclude further litigation and the eventual appeal.
I think it's a very important case; we'll be exploring it in more depth in connection with an upcoming CAALRS collection seminar. Keep an eye on this blog, and/or Utahcondolaw.com for information on the date, time and other subjects to be covered.
CAALRS, Utahcondolaw.com and this blog are all sponsored by the law firm of Hobbs & Olson, L.C.
Sunday, February 22, 2009
UCIOA Consideration Postponed
Marla Mott-Smith Bowers, Chair of the Utah Legislative Action Committee (ULAC), has advised that the Utah Legislature will not be considering the adoption of the Uniform Common Ownership Interest Act this session, as had been hoped and anticipated. From her press release:
Due to the magnitude of UCIOA and Legislative Research time restraints, Senator Greg Bell will not submit UCIOA this session. Instead, he will submit it during the interim session to be held sometime in May or June, 2009.
Senators Michael Waddoups and Greg Bell recognize the need in Utah for the type of comprehensive act we have proposed and remain committed to the passage of UCIOA.
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Get Your Pools and Spas Fixed NOW!
Last Friday's uccai meeting addressed pool safety and the need to modify your pools pursuant to the Virginia Graeme Baker Pool and Spa Safety Act; seven months ago I suggested in this post that you shouldn't even have waited for the law to take effect before modifying your pools and spas. (The law took effect in December.)
Now, unfortunately, there's news of another unfortunate death due to a pool drain. Five-year-old Linnea Rose Oldham of Snyderville, Utah was killed in a tragic drain-related incident while vacationing in Mexico; according to the article in the Park Record, the family wants the story to get out, in hopes that it will prevent other similar tragedies.
Please, if your association's pools and spas have not been modified, shut them down and get them fixed now.
My thoughts and condolences to Linnea's family and loved ones.
Now, unfortunately, there's news of another unfortunate death due to a pool drain. Five-year-old Linnea Rose Oldham of Snyderville, Utah was killed in a tragic drain-related incident while vacationing in Mexico; according to the article in the Park Record, the family wants the story to get out, in hopes that it will prevent other similar tragedies.
Please, if your association's pools and spas have not been modified, shut them down and get them fixed now.
My thoughts and condolences to Linnea's family and loved ones.
Tuesday, February 10, 2009
It's Happening Here, Too!
No, this is not an alarmist blog entry about Jon Huntsman's support of civil unions for gay couples. That's not the subject of this blog.
What I'm referring to is the stripping of units that are being foreclosed, which I blogged about last month, when I was live blogging from Palm Springs.
KSL is reporting that some foreclosed homeowners in Utah are stripping and/or vandalizing their foreclosed homes. According to the article, "Michael Leavitt, a home inspector, says the bigger problem comes when people buy foreclosed homes at an auction and don't actually see the house."
(The article didn't say, but I don't think that's our former governor Michael Leavitt, although sources do say that he recently lost his job...)
Apparently here, as in Florida, both theft and/or vandalism occasionally follow foreclosures. Once again, vigilance and observation of foreclosed units seems to be prudent.
What I'm referring to is the stripping of units that are being foreclosed, which I blogged about last month, when I was live blogging from Palm Springs.
KSL is reporting that some foreclosed homeowners in Utah are stripping and/or vandalizing their foreclosed homes. According to the article, "Michael Leavitt, a home inspector, says the bigger problem comes when people buy foreclosed homes at an auction and don't actually see the house."
(The article didn't say, but I don't think that's our former governor Michael Leavitt, although sources do say that he recently lost his job...)
Apparently here, as in Florida, both theft and/or vandalism occasionally follow foreclosures. Once again, vigilance and observation of foreclosed units seems to be prudent.
Housing Tax Breaks
Yesterday's New York Times has an article on the proposed housing and other tax breaks under the proposed stimulus plan; for homes purchased after April 9, 2008 and before July 1, 2009, "first time homebuyer" couples can receive up to $7,500 tax credit. "First Time Homebuyers" are defined broadly; there are phase outs for higher income categories.
All of this is subject to change, of course, as the House and Senate work to reconcile their bills.
All of this is subject to change, of course, as the House and Senate work to reconcile their bills.
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